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Introduction. In distributed systems, where problem solutions have to be
jointly derived by several selfish agents and where problem data is spread over
the agents as private information, mechanism design is used to motivate agents
to reveal their private information truthfully and to obtain a good overall solu-
tion for the system. As a simple example, consider single item auctions, where
several bidders are asked to reveal their valuation for a certain good. Dependent
on the bids, the mechanism allocates the good to one of the bidders and the
price of the good is designed such that agents have an incentive to bid their
true valuation. We consider direct revelation mechanisms, which consist of an
allocation rule that selects an allocation depending on the agents’ reports about
their private information, and a payment scheme that assigns a payment to ev-
ery agent. Allocation rules that give rise to a mechanism in which truth-telling
is a dominant strategy for every agent are called truthfully implementable. Our
concern is with the payment scheme that extends a truthfully implementable
allocation rule to a truthful mechanism. The property of an allocation rule
to have a unique payment scheme completing the allocation rule to a truth-
ful mechanism is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization for an
allocation rule to satisfy revenue equivalence. In order to obtain this charac-
terization, we prove a property on complete directed graphs and apply it to
the so called allocation graph, which is defined by the allocation rule and the
valuation function of an agent. The characterization holds for any (possibly
infinite) outcome space. Furthermore, we give elementary and simple proofs for
the uniqueness of the payment scheme in a truthful mechanism for the cases
of finite and countably infinite outcome spaces under very weak assumptions.
Many of the known results follow as immediate consequences of ours, e.g. results
in Green and Laffont [2], Holmstro¨m [4], Krishna and Maenner [5], Milgrom and
Segal [6], Suijs [10] and Chung and Olszewski [1]. For details and discussions,
especially of the paper by Chung and Olszewski, we refer to the full version of
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the paper [11].
Setting and Basic Concepts. Let the set of agents be denoted by
{1, . . . , n} and let A be the (possibly infinite) set of alternative allocations or
outcomes. By ti, we denote the type of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which is an ele-
ment of the type space Ti ⊆ Rki for some ki ∈ N. Agent i’s preferences over
outcomes are modeled by the valuation function vi : A×Ti → R, where vi(a, ti)
is the valuation of agent i for outcome a when he has type ti. A mechanism
(f, pi) consists of an allocation rule f : ×ni=1 Ti → A and a payment scheme
pi : ×ni=1 Ti → Rn. In a direct revelation mechanism, the allocation rule chooses
for a vector τ of aggregate type reports of all agents an outcome f(τ), whereas
the payment scheme assigns a payment pii(τ) to each agent i. Let the vec-
tor (t−i, ti) denote the aggregate type report vector when i reports ti and the
other agents’ reports are represented by t−i. We assume quasi-linear utilities,
that is, the utility of agent i when the aggregate report vector is (t−i, ti) is
vi(f(t−i, ti), ti)−pii(t−i, ti). In a truthful mechanism, truth-telling is a (weakly)
dominant strategy for every agent:
Definition 1 (dominant strategy incentive compatible, truthful) A di-
rect revelation mechanism (f, pi) is called dominant strategy incentive compati-
ble or truthful if for every agent i, every type ti ∈ Ti, all aggregate type vectors
t−i that the other agents could report and every type si ∈ Ti that i could report
instead of ti: vi(f(t−i, ti), ti)− pii(t−i, ti) ≥ vi(f(t−i, si), ti)− pii(t−i, si). If for
allocation rule f there exists a payment scheme pi such that (f, pi) is a truthful
mechanism, then f is called truthfully implementable.
Definition 2 (Revenue Equivalence) A truthfully implementable allocation
rule f satisfies the revenue equivalence property if for any two incentive com-
patible mechanisms (f, pi) and (f, pi′) and any agent i there exists a function
hi that only depends on the reported types of the other agents t−i such that
∀ti ∈ Ti : pii(ti, t−i) = pi′i(ti, t−i) + hi(t−i).
Unique Node Potentials in Directed Graphs. Let G = (V,E) be a com-
plete directed graph with (possibly infinite) node set V and arc set E. We
assume that G does not contain a negative cycle. By `ab we denote the (finite)
length of the arc from node a to node b. Let a, b ∈ V be two nodes and let P
a (finite) path from a to b – or short (a, b)-path – in G. Denote its length by
length(P ). For a = b, we regard the path without any edges as (a, b)-path as
well and define its length as 0. Define P(a, b) as the set of all (a, b)-paths. Let
distG(a, b) = infP∈P(a,b) length(P ). If V is a finite set, then distG(a, b) simply
equals the length of a shortest path from a to b in G. For infinite V , such a
shortest path may not exist. Nevertheless, distG(a, b) is finite, since we assume
that G does not have any negative cycle and hence length(P ) + `ba ≥ 0 holds
for every (a, b)-path P . A node potential p is a function p : V → R such that
for all arcs (i, j) ∈ E p(j) ≤ p(i) + `ij . It is well known that the existence of a
node potential in a graph is equivalent to the non-existence of negative cycles
in that graph. We prove the following characterization for its uniqueness.
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Theorem 1 Let G = (V,E) be a complete directed graph that does not contain
a negative cycle. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) Any two node potentials in G differ only by a constant.
(2) For all a, b ∈ V , distG(a, b) + distG(b, a) = 0.
Next, we define a property of the graph G that is sufficient (though not
necessary) for uniqueness of node potentials up to a constant.
Definition 3 (Two-Cycle Connected) A graph with node set V and arc
lengths ` is called two-cycle connected if for every partition V1 ∪ V2 = V ,
V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, V1, V2 6= ∅, there are a1 ∈ V1 and a2 ∈ V2 with `a1a2 + `a2a1 = 0.
Theorem 2 Let G be a directed graph without negative cycle. If G is two-cycle
connected then its node potential is uniquely defined up to a constant.
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence. Fix agent i and let the reports
of the other agents be fixed as well. For simplicity of notation we write T
and v instead of Ti and vi. We regard f and pi as functions of i’s type alone,
i.e. f : T → A and pi : T → R. Let f be truthfully implementable. Revenue
equivalence asserts that any two payment schemes assigning a payment to each
type of agent i differ by a constant. If (f, pi) is truthful, it is easy to see that
for any pair of types s, t ∈ T such that f(t) = f(s) = a for some a ∈ A,
the payments must be equal, i.e. pi(t) = pi(s) =: pia. A payment scheme for
agent i is therefore completely defined if the numbers pia are defined for all
outcomes a ∈ A such that f−1(a) is nonempty. Therefore, we may without loss
of generality assume that f is onto.
As in Gui et al. [3] and Saks and Yu [9], let us define the complete directed
and possibly infinite allocation graph Gf with node set A. Between any two
nodes a, b ∈ A, there is a directed arc with length `ab = inft∈f−1(b)(v(b, t) −
v(a, t)). From Gui et al. [3] and Rochet [8] follows that f is truthfully imple-
mentable if and only if Gf does not have a finite cycle of negative length. Let us
call this property the nonnegative cycle property. We observe that a payment
scheme that complements an allocation rule f to a truthful mechanism can be
interpreted as a node potential in Gf . Hence, a truthfully implementable allo-
cation rule f satisfies revenue equivalence if and only if in Gf the node potential
is uniquely defined up to a constant. Note that the existence of a node potential
is already guaranteed by the nonnegative cycle property. The characterization
of its uniqueness up to a constant follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 Let f be a truthfully implementable allocation rule. Then f satis-
fies revenue equivalence iff distGf (a, b) + distGf (b, a) = 0 for all a, b ∈ A.
For finite outcome spaces, we prove that revenue equivalence is satisfied
under very weak conditions, which cannot be relaxed. More specifically, the
following result follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 Let A be a finite outcome space. Let each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have
types from the (topologically) connected type space Ti ⊆ Rki . Let each agent’s
3
valuation function vi(a, ·) be a continuous function in the type of the agent for
every a ∈ A. Then, every truthfully implementable allocation rule f satisfies
revenue equivalence.
For countably infinite outcome spaces the following theorem follows from
Theorem 1.
Theorem 5 Let A be a countable outcome space. Let each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
have types from the (topologically) connected type space Ti ⊆ Rki . Let for each
agent the valuation functions vi(a, ·) : Ti → R, a ∈ A be equicontinuous func-
tions. Then, every truthfully implementable allocation rule f satisfies revenue
equivalence.
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